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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
DISCHARGE. A creditor loaned money to the debtor
who granted a security interest in farm machinery and
growing crops to secure the loan. The creditor sought to
deny the debtor a discharge under either Section 727 or 523
because the debtor failed to apply the proceeds of the sale of
the crop to the loan, the debtor did not own a piece of
equipment pledged as security for the loan, and the debtor
no longer had possession of other equipment pledged as
collateral. The court held that discharge would not be denied
to the debtor because the creditor failed to demonstrate that
the debtor willfully and maliciously intended to harm the
creditor financially by not applying the proceeds of the crop
sale to the loan. The court also held that the debtor truly
believed, although erroneously, that the debtor owned the
piece of farm equipment and had no idea where the other
equipment was located. In re Lane, 166 B.R. 133 (Bankr.
E.D. Mo. 1993).
EXEMPTIONS
HOMESTEAD. The debtors claimed a homestead
exemption for their farm homestead which had consensual
liens against it in excess of the fair market value. The court
held that the debtors could not avoid judgment liens against
the property because the debtors had no equity in the
property. In re Ivie, 165 B.R. 477 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1994).
The debtor was a factory worker and claimed a 25 acre
parcel of rural property as exempt under Wis. Stat. §
990.01(14). The parcel contained a one acre residential area,
about 10 acres of timberland used for wood used for heating
, about five acres of pasture used for livestock, and about ten
acres of tillable land used to grow feed for the livestock.
The value of all of the land was $41,800. The court held that
the debtor could exempt as much of the land as was valued
at $40,000, the monetary limit of the homestead exemption,
because the objecting creditor had not shown that the land
was not reasonably necessary for the debtor’s use as a home.
In re Burgus, 166 B.R. 126 (W.D. Wis. 1991), aff’g, 166
B.R. 121 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1990).
INHERITED PROPERTY. The debtors received
inherited property within 180 days after the filing of the
petition and claimed the property as exempt under Md.
Code Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 11-504(b)(2) which exempted
“money payable in the event of … death of any person.”
The debtors argued that an inheritance was money payable
because of the death of the decedent. The court held that
although the statute was ambiguous, the intent of the
legislature was not to include inherited property in the
exemption. In re Royal, 165 B.R. 802 (Bankr. D. Md.
1994).
SAVINGS BONDS. The debtors purchased Series EE
savings bonds using tenancy by the entireties property and
claimed the bonds as exempt tenancy by the entireties
property. The court held that the ownership of the bonds
was governed by federal regulations which allowed each
owner to redeem the bonds; therefore, the debtors could not
exempt the bonds as entireties property. In re Pernia, 165
B.R. 581 (Bankr. D. Md. 1994).
SETOFF. The debtor had obtained a loan from the
FmHA on which the debtor had defaulted pre-petition. The
debtor had also enrolled farm land in the Conservation
Reserve Program (CRP). The FmHA notified the debtor of
its application to the ASCS to offset the debtor’s CRP
payments against the default on the debtor’s FmHA loan.
The offset was allowed and the debtor filed for Chapter 13
and the debtor assumed the CRP contract. The debtor
argued that the FmHA was not entitled to offset the CRP
payments in the bankruptcy case because the CRP contract
was executory and contingent upon the debtor’s
performance. In addition, the assumption of the contract
post-petition destroyed the mutuality between the pre- and
post-petition CRP contracts. The court held that the filing of
the bankruptcy case and assumption of the CRP contract did
not change the basic rights and obligations of the parties and
that the CRP payments could be offset against the debtor’s
debt to the FmHA. In re Buckner, 165 B.R. 942 (D.Kan.
1994).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
DISMISSAL. The debtors filed a voluntary dismissal of
their Chapter 12 case. The court found that the debtors
failed to properly prosecute their case and abused the
bankruptcy process by failing to file complete valuation and
financial schedules. The court granted the dismissal but held
that the debtors could not refile a bankruptcy case for at
least 180 days. In re Hildreth, 165 B.R. 429 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1994).
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PLAN . The debtor’s Chapter 12 plan provided for
surrender of the debtor’s stock and allocated surplus in a
Farm Credit Association  in satisfaction of a secured debt
owed to the Association. The Association objected to the
plan as against the bylaws of the Association. The court held
that the debtor could redeem the stock and allocated surplus
to pay secured claims of the Association. In re Carter, 165
B.R. 518 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
AUTOMATIC STAY. In March 1992, the IRS assessed
a penalty against the debtor for failure to timely deposit
employment taxes. In June 1992, the debtor filed for
Chapter 11 and in December 1992, the debtor elected to
carryback 1991 net operating losses to 1988 and filed for a
refund. The IRS granted the refund request but offset the
penalty amount from the refund check. The debtor argued
that the offset violated the automatic stay and sought
recovery of the setoff amount. The court held that the IRS
was entitled to the setoff but violated the automatic stay.
The court allowed the IRS to keep the setoff amount but
ordered the IRS to pay for the reasonable attorney’s fees and
costs incurred by the debtor to bring the action to enforce
the automatic stay.  In re Midway Industrial Contractors,
Inc., 94-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,268 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1994).
CLAIMS. The debtors had filed a Chapter 11 case
which was closed in November 1989. The IRS had filed a
claim for 1986 and 1987 taxes and had not objected to the
plan or closing of the case. In 1991, the IRS audited the
debtors’ 1986 return and assessed the debtors for additional
taxes for 1986 and 1987 with penalties.  The debtors sought
a declaratory judgment that the IRS assessments were
precluded by the final judgment in the bankruptcy case. The
IRS argued that the assessments were new claims. The court
held that the assessments were sufficiently connected to the
bankruptcy claims to be precluded by the final bankruptcy
judgment. In re DePaolo, 165 B.R. 491 (D. Wyo. 1994).
The debtor included federal tax claims, including a claim
for withholding taxes, in the schedules filed with the
petition and the IRS filed a timely claim for income taxes.
The IRS filed a late amended claim including additional
amounts for unpaid withholding taxes and the trustee
objected, arguing that the amended claim was improper
because the claim for withholding taxes was a new claim.
The Bankruptcy and District Courts held that the amended
claim was not allowed to the extent of the new claim for
withholding taxes because the claim did not relate to the
timely income tax claim and the debtor gave the IRS notice
of the debtor's relationship with the business in the schedule
of claims. The appellate court reversed, holding that priority
tax claims need not be timely filed.  In re Vecchio, 20 F.3d
555 (2d Cir. 1994), rev’g, 147 B.R. 303 (E.D. N.Y. 1992),
aff’g, 132 B.R. 239 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1991).
The debtors filed their Chapter 13 petition in August
1991 and the IRS filed a claim for 1990 taxes. The IRS filed
a second claim for 1982 through 1986 and 1990 taxes after
the bar date for claims. The court held that the untimely
filed claims were not allowed because the claims were not
related to the timely filed claim. In re Waindel, 166 B.R 87
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1993).
DISCHARGE. In 1986, the debtors filed a Chapter 13
case which was voluntarily dismissed in 1988. In 1990, the
debtors filed a Chapter 7 petition in which federal tax claims
for 1984 and 1985 were filed. The IRS argued that the
Section 507 period for dischargeability of taxes was tolled
during the first Chapter 13 case. The court held that the
Section 108(c) rule for suspension of limitation periods did
not apply to Section 507; therefore, the 1984 and 1985 tax
claims were dischargeable. Matter of Quenzer, 19 F.3d
163 (5th Cir. 1993).
In 1987, the debtor filed a Chapter 11 case which was
dismissed in 1990. In 1991, the debtor filed another Chapter
11 petition which was converted to Chapter 7. The issue was
whether the first Chapter 11 case tolled the limitation period
in Section 507.  The court held that the Section 108(c) rule
for suspension of limitation periods did apply to Section
507; therefore, the tax claims for which a return was filed
less than three years before the second Chapter 11 filing, not
including the period of the first case, were not
dischargeable. In re Teeslink, 165 BR. 708 (Bankr. S.D.
Ga. 1994).
The debtor had filed a Chapter 13 case in November
1987 which was dismissed in April 1992. The debtor refiled
for Chapter 13 in May 1992 and sought to have federal taxes
for 1984 and 1986 declared dischargeable because the
returns for those years were filed more than three years
before the filing of the second Chapter 13 case. The court
held that the first Chapter 13 case tolled the three year
period and that the taxes were not dischargeable. Matter of
Reed, 165 B.R. 959 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993).
The debtors sought to have taxes assessed more than
three years before the bankruptcy filing declared
dischargeable. The IRS argued that the taxes were not
dischargeable because the debtors willfully attempted to
evade the taxes. The IRS cited evidence that the debtors
transferred assets to their children or to trusts for the
children while the debtors were being audited and their
businesses were declining. The court held that the IRS failed
to prove that the transfers were an attempt to avoid payment
of the assessments because the transfers were either for
adequate consideration or made for legitimate estate
planning reasons and were made before the assessments
were made. Matter of Koehl, 166 B.R. 74 (Bankr. E.D.
La. 1993).
DISMISSAL. The debtor had not filed a federal tax
return since 1983, including returns due during the
bankruptcy case filed in 1992. The IRS had made
assessments pre-petition and filed claims in the case for
1984 through 1989 taxes. The debtor’s plan did not provide
for payment of any of the tax claims and the IRS moved to
dismiss the case for bad faith filing. The debtor sought an
extension of time to file the relevant tax returns and an order
that the IRS turn over all records on the debtor’s taxes so
that the debtor could file the returns. The court held that the
case would be dismissed for bad faith filing in that the
debtor was only creating delays in the collection of the taxes
due and that the debtor had no ability to propose a
confirmable plan. Matter of Spurgeon, 166 B.R. 150
(Bankr. D. Neb. 1993).
PLAN ALLOCATION OF TAX PAYMENTS. The
debtor’s plan provided for allocation of all tax payments to
the trust fund portion of a federal employment tax claim
before payment of penalties and interest on that claim. The
court ruled that the allocation would be allowed because it
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was necessary for the successful reorganization of the
debtor. In re M.C. Tooling Consultants, Inc., 165 B.R.
590 (Bankr. D. S.C. 1993).
PRIORITY. The debtor had filed two Chapter 11 cases
with the plan confirmed in the first case. The IRS had filed
claims in the first case and when the debtor defaulted on the
plan payments of the taxes, filed tax liens for the tax claims
before the filing of the second case. Two state taxing
agencies made assessments during the first bankruptcy case
and several assessments before the second case.  The parties
sought a determination of the priority of the various
assessments. The court held that the IRS tax liens were valid
and effective to give the IRS secured claims in the second
case. The state assessments made during the first bankruptcy
case were void for violation of the automatic stay. The
remaining assessments did not have priority over the federal
tax liens.. In re W.F. Monroe Cigar Co., 166 B.R. 110
(N.D. Ill. 1994), rev’g, 157 B.R. 125 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1993).
TAX LIENS . The IRS held a tax lien against the
debtor’s property which included a tenancy by the entireties
interest in a residence. The court held that under Maryland
law, liens against the property of one tenant may not be
enforced against property held by two persons as tenants by
the entireties; therefore, the federal tax lien was
unenforceable against the debtor’s interest in the residence.
In re Street, 165 B.R. 408 (Bankr. D. Md. 1994).
COOPERATIVES
MERGER. The plaintiff was a member of a for-profit
agricultural cooperative which merged with another
cooperative. Pursuant to Mich. Code § 450.11101, the
plaintiff dissented to the merger and requested the
cooperative to purchase the plaintiff’s shares in the
cooperative. The plaintiff owned ten shares of common
stock, which entitled the plaintiff to vote on cooperative
matters, and preferred stock, which determined the
plaintiff’s  dividend and liquidation rights. The court held
that the plaintiff was entitled to receive the par value of the
common stock. The court also held that the value of the
preferred stock was the portion of the cooperative’s net
worth equal to the ratio of the plaintiff’s preferred stock to
all issued preferred stock. Ludington Fruit v. Dolson, 514
N.W.2d 169 (Mich. App. 1994).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
AGRICULTURAL LABOR-ALM § 3.02.*  The
plaintiffs were migrant seasonal agricultural workers who
worked on the defendants’ farm  picking cucumbers. The
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated the Migrant
and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act
(MSAWPA) in that the defendants intentionally (1) failed to
properly withhold FICA taxes (see case discussion under
Social Security Tax, infra), (2) failed to disclose
employment information when the defendants recruited the
plaintiffs, (3) failed to keep complete and accurate
employment and wage records, and (4) failed to provide and
post complete information on the terms and conditions for
occupancy of the plaintiffs’ housing.   The court held that
(1) the FICA withholding violations also violated
MSAWPA, (2) the defendants were not required to disclose
the employment information because the defendants did not
“recruit” the plaintiffs, (3) the defendants failure to keep
accurate employment records and post housing terms and
conditions violated the MSAWPA.  Sanchez v. Overmyer,
845 F. Supp. 1183 (N.D. Ohio 1993).
CROP INSURANCE-ALM § 13.04.*  The FCIC has
issued proposed regulations adding provisions for cotton
crop insurance to the Common Crop Insurance Policy. 59
Fed. Reg. 28022 (May 31, 1994).
The FCIC has issued proposed regulations adding
provisions for extra long stable cotton crop insurance to the
Common Crop Insurance Policy. 59 Fed. Reg. 28027 (May
31, 1994).
The FCIC has issued proposed regulations adding
provisions for coarse grains (corn, grain sorghum and
soybeans) crop insurance to the Common Crop Insurance
Policy. The provisions allow for coverage for late and
prevented planting. 59 Fed. Reg. 28016 (May 31, 1994).
The FCIC has issued proposed regulations amending the
common crop insurance regulations changing from one to
three the number of years a policy does not earn a premium
without termination. 59 Fed. Reg. 30537 (June 14, 1994).
The FCIC has issued proposed regulations amending the
nursery crop insurance regulations to allow a six month
delay in the payment of premiums to March 31 of the
following year. 59 Fed. Reg. 30536 (June 14, 1994).
MEAT AND POULTRY PRODUCTS. The FSIS has
issued proposed regulations governing the use of health
claims on labels of meat and poultry products. 59 Fed. Reg.
27144 (May 25, 1994).
TOBACCO. The ASCS has adopted as final regulations
governing the recordkeeping, penalties, appeals and other
matters pertaining to the requirement that tobacco product
manufacturers pay assessments if less than 75 percent of a
tobacco product comes from domestic tobacco. 59 Fed.
Reg. 28207 (June 1, 1994).
TUBERCULOSIS . The APHIS has issued interim
regulation changing the designation of New York from a
modified accredited state to an accredited free state. 59 Fed.
Reg. 29185 (June 6, 1994).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[4].* The
taxpayer was a limited partnership which established a
charitable remainder unitrust with the partnership receiving
the unitrust amount over 20 years. The trust contained
provisions required by Rev. Ruls. 72-395, 80-123, 82-128
and 82-165. The IRS ruled that the partnership was an
eligible grantor because all of the partners were eligible
grantors. The IRS also ruled that the trust qualified as a
charitable remainder unitrust and the partnership was an
eligible beneficiary of the trust. Ltr. Rul. 9419021, Feb. 10,
1994.
The decedent was a life income beneficiary of a marital
trust established by a predeceased spouse. The trust was
includible in the decedent’s estate. Under the decedent’s
will, the trust property passed to a charitable remainder
unitrust with the lesser of trust income or a certain
percentage of trust property paid to the beneficiary. The
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decedent’s will allocated to the marital trust property the
estate taxes resulting from the trust property but provided no
allocation formula between trust income and principal. The
state law provided that estate taxes were to be allocated
entirely to principal if a present and future interest were
involved. The IRS ruled that the charitable deduction for the
unitrust was to be calculated by determining the net amount
passing to the unitrust before payment of estate taxes,
subtracting the federal estate taxes and multiplying the
remainder by the appropriate unitrust remainder factor in
IRS Pub. 1458. Ltr. Rul. 9419006, Jan. 31, 1994.
CITY INHERITANCE TAX. The decedent’s estate
was subject to and paid a city inheritance tax on most of the
decedent’s estate and sought to deduct the city inheritance
taxes under I.R.C. § 2053, arguing that the legislative
history of the precursor of Section 2053 would allow such
taxes to be deducted as an administrative expense. The IRS
ruled that Section 2053 was unambiguous in prohibiting a
deduction for any inheritance taxes paid by an estate. In
addition, the IRS found no support in the legislative history
for such a deduction. Ltr. Rul. 9422002, Feb. 16, 1994.
DISCLAIMERS-ALM § 5.02[6].* The decedent and
surviving spouse had owned two brokerage accounts as joint
tenants, although the ruling is not precisely clear as to the
ownership. The decedent’s will bequeathed all of the
decedent’s property to the surviving spouse. The surviving
spouse filed a written disclaimer of the decedent’s interest in
the brokerage accounts, which then passed to the decedent’s
children. The surviving spouse claimed to have not accepted
any of the benefits from the decedent’s portion of the
brokerage accounts. The IRS ruled that the disclaimer was
valid for federal estate tax purposes. Ltr. Rul. 9420031,
Feb. 22, 1994.
FLOWER BONDS. The decedent’s estate included
“flower bonds” which the executor used to pay federal
estate taxes based on the par value of the bonds plus accrued
interest. The executor argued that the value of the bonds
should have been increased to account for additional interest
accrued during the nine month grace period available to
estates in paying federal estate tax. The court held that only
the value of the bonds as of the date of death can be used
and that any subsequent effects on bond value cannot be
included in the date of death value. Weld v. Comm’r, 31
Fed. Cls. 81 (1994).
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX-ALM
§ 5.04[6].* In 1973, the decedent’s will established nine
trusts for the decedent’s issue. The trustees sought court
approval of modifications in the trustees’ duties and
appointment procedures. The trustees also sought court
construction of the trusts to determine whether accumulated
income was to be allocated to principal or whether the
income remained distributable in years in which the trust
income was not sufficient to support the beneficiary. The
IRS ruled that the modification of trustee administration of
the trusts would not subject the trusts to GSTT. The IRS
also ruled that the judicial construction of the trust would be
a modification of the trusts subjecting the trusts to GSTT.
Ltr. Rul. 9421031, Feb. 28, 1994; Ltr. Rul. 9421036, Feb.
28, 1994.
In 1936 a testamentary trust was established for the
decedent’s three children. The trust provided for distribution
of the trust principal on the death of the last surviving
beneficiary to the issue of the three children. The families of
the three children could not agree as to how the individual
members would share in the distribution but agreed to a
compromise which established new trusts. The IRS ruled
that the compromise was within the reasonable
interpretation of the intent of the original trust and would
not create any taxable gifts to the beneficiaries. The IRS
also ruled that although the older members of the families
involved reached the compromise agreement, the older
members would not be treated as the transferors of the trust
property to the new trusts; therefore, the new trusts were not
subject to GSTT. Ltr. Rul. 9421048, March 3, 1994.
GIFT-ALM § 6.01.* The decedent and son were partners
in a jewelry business. In 1979, the decedent and son had
entered into an agreement to increase the son’s share in the
partnership, effective in 1980. The court held that no gift of
the increase of  the son’s partnership interest occurred in
1979 because the agreement did not take effect until 1980.
The IRS had not argued that the agreement was a binding
promise sufficient to make the agreement a gift when made.
Ulmer v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-234.
A trust was created in 1959 in which the taxpayer had a
remainder interest in trust which provided for payment of
trust income to the taxpayer upon termination of the 1959
trust until the taxpayer reached age 30 at which time the
entire trust principal was to be distributed to the taxpayer.
The trust also provided the taxpayer with the power to
appoint the trust to other family members. The taxpayer had
not reached age 30 and had exercised the power of
appointment to appoint the trust to new trusts for the benefit
of other family members. The IRS ruled that the exercise of
the power of appointment produced taxable gifts of the
taxpayer’s current right to receive income from the trust and
the right to receive trust property when the taxpayer reached
age 30. Ltr. Rul. 9419007, Feb. 3, 1994.
In 1984, the taxpayer owned all of the voting common
stock in a corporation. Each of the taxpayer’s children
owned 1,000 shares of nonvoting preferred stock which
were each convertible to 2 shares of voting common stock
after January 31, 1985. The corporation had the right to
redeem the preferred stock for $100 per share. The
corporation had sufficient funds to redeem the stock on
January 31, 1985 and the taxpayer had complete control
over the corporation to require the redemption but no
redemption was made. The taxpayer’s children exercised
their conversion rights, increasing the value of their
holdings in the corporation and decreasing the value of the
taxpayer’s holdings. The IRS ruled that the failure of the
taxpayer to redeem the stock was a taxable gift to the
children in the amount of the increase in the value of their
holdings in the corporation over the redemption value of the
preferred stock. Ltr. Rul. 9420001, Dec. 15, 1993.
In 1974, the taxpayer and son formed a corporation, with
the taxpayer receiving 51 percent of the stock and the son
receiving 49 percent of the stock. The taxpayer wrote a
“counter letter” which stated that all of the stock was owned
by the son and that the taxpayer merely “held” the stock for
the son. However, the taxpayer continued to vote the stock
and to receive 51 percent of the corporation income and the
son never acted as the sole owner of the corporation. The
Tax Court held that the taxpayer’s 1988 transfer of title to
the taxpayer’s stock to the son was a taxable gift because the
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taxpayer retained possession and control over the stock until
that time. Autin v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. No. 35 (1994).
GROSS ESTATE-ALM § 5.02.* The taxpayer was the
sole shareholder of a corporation which had an unrelated
person as general manager. Under an agreement with the
general manager, the general manager established a life
insurance trust which owned a life insurance policy on the
life of the taxpayer. The premiums were paid by the general
manager who received additional compensation from the
corporation for the premiums. The agreement required the
general manager to use the proceeds only for the purpose of
buying the stock of the corporation from the taxpayer’s
estate. The taxpayer had the power to terminate the
employment of the general manager which also would
terminate the general manager’s rights under the life
insurance trust. The IRS ruled that the life insurance policy
would not be included in the taxpayer’s gross estate because
the taxpayer did not hold an incident of ownership in the
policy. Ltr. Rul. 9421037, Feb. 28, 1994.
INSTALLMENT PAYMENT OF ESTATE TAX-
ALM § 5.05[1]. * The decedent owned several residential
rental properties through a trust. The properties were
managed and serviced by the decedent and four employees.
The IRS ruled that the decedent’s interest in the properties
was considered a single closely-held business and was
eligible for installment payment of estate tax. The trust
provided that on the death of the decedent, the trust assets
were to be distributed to an exemption trust (equal to the
unified credit amount), a survivor’s trust (the community
property of the surviving spouse), and a marital trust (the
remainder of the decedent’s interest in trust not distributed
to the exemption trust). The distributions were allowed on a
non-pro rata basis. The IRS ruled that the transfers of trust
property to the other trusts would not cause recognition of
gain. Ltr. Rul. 9422052, March 9, 1994.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].*  The
decedent bequeathed property in trust to the surviving
spouse but the will provided that if the executor did not elect
QTIP treatment for the trust, the trust assets would pass to a
trust for the decedent's children. The Tax Court held that the
trust was not eligible for the marital deduction because the
executor had the power to defeat the surviving spouse's
interest in the trust.  The appellate court reversed, holding
that the executor’s power to make the election did not
amount to a power to appoint the property to someone other
than the surviving spouse. Est. of Robertson v. Comm'r,
94-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,153 (8th Cir. 1994), rev’g,
98 T.C. 678 (1992).
The taxpayers, husband and wife, established a
revocable inter vivos trust funded with the husband’s IRA.
At the death of one of the taxpayers, the trust became
irrevocable and split into four trusts, with the trusts to
distribute at least annually to the beneficiaries the lesser of
the IRA income or the minimum IRA distribution amount.
The IRS ruled that the trusts which had the surviving spouse
as sole beneficiary were QTIP. Ltr. Rul. 9420034, Feb. 23,
1994.
The decedent’s will bequeathed the residue of the estate
to a trust for the surviving spouse with a minimum annual
income of $30,000 or the net annual income of the trust. The
trust was not eligible for QTIP. The surviving spouse
challenged an antenuptial agreement in state court and filed
a claim for the elective share of the decedent’s estate. The
claim was not contested and the state court held that the
antenuptial agreement was revoked by the decedent and
allowed the surviving spouse to take the elective share. The
Tax Court held that the estate was not entitled to a marital
deduction for the amount of the elected share because the
estate failed to show that the surviving spouse had any right
to the property other than as a result of the state court action.
Est. of Simpson v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-259.
VALUATION. On the date of death, the decedent
owned 99.86 percent of an investment corporation which
owned 26 percent of the common stock of another
corporation. The other common stock of the corporation was
owned by the decedent or other family members. The
investment corporation bylaws assigned the decedent’s
stock a liquidation value of $100 per share, the value of the
stock contributed to the corporation by the decedent. The
decedent’s estate elected to value the stock on the alternate
valuation date. After the decedent’s death, but before the
alternative valuation date, the corporation merged with
another corporation and the investment corporation received
5.4 percent of the new corporation. The IRS ruled that the
liquidation value assigned to the stock by the bylaws was
not a maximum valuation of the stock for estate tax
purposes and that the investment corporation’s rights to sell
its stock in the new corporation would be limited by Rules
144 and 145 of the SEC because the investment corporation
was an “affiliate” of the new corporation. Ltr. Rul.
9419001, Jan. 5, 1994.
The IRS has adopted as final regulations providing for
valuation rules and tables for annuities, life estates and




ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS. The IRS has adopted as
final regulations governing the recovery of administrative
costs incurred by taxpayers in connection with an
administrative proceeding with the IRS. 59 Fed. Reg. 29359
(June 7, 1994).
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS. The IRS has issued
final regulations relating to the circumstances in which a
party is considered to have exhausted all administrative
appeals to the IRS for the purposes of recovering court costs
and fees in a civil tax proceeding brought in a court of the
U.S. 59 Fed. Reg. 29356 (June 7, 1994).
CAPITAL EXPENSES. A manufacturer had to
capitalize the costs of installing a sprinkler system in a
factory because the system increased the useful life of the
factory. Concord Instruments Corp. v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1994-248.
CLEAN-UP COSTS. The taxpayer was an accrual basis
corporation which operated a manufacturing plant. The
corporation buried the hazardous waste produced by the
plant on the land owned by the corporation. The corporation
was ordered to clean-up the contaminated soil by removing
the contaminated soil and refilling the land with
uncontaminated soil. The corporation also constructed
groundwater treatment facilities.  The IRS ruled that the
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corporation must capitalize the costs of construction of the
groundwater treatment facilities because the facilities have a
useful life substantially beyond the taxable year of
construction. The costs of operating the groundwater
treatment facilities were currently deductible. The IRS also
ruled that the costs of cleaning up the contaminated soil
were currently deductible because the costs did not produce
future benefits to the corporation and the land was not
eligible for depreciation, amortization or depletion
deductions.Rev. Rul. 94-38, I.R.B. 1994-25.
INTEREST RATE.  The IRS has announced that for
the period July 1, 1994 through September 30, 1994, the
interest rate paid on tax overpayments has been increased to
7 percent and for underpayments to 8 percent. The interest
rate for underpayments by large corporations increased to
10 percent. Rev. Rul. 94-39.
INVESTMENT INTEREST-ALM § 4.03[12].* The
taxpayers had excess investment interest from tax years
1983-1986 and carried the undeducted interest to 1987, in
which most of the excess interest was offset against
investment income in 1987. The remainder was carried over
to 1988 but the investment interest again exceeded income
and the total excess was carried over to 1989. The IRS
argued that the carryover amount was limited to taxable
income for each of the years involved. The court held that
the amount of excess investment interest carried over was
not limited to the taxpayer’s taxable income in each year.
Flood v. U.S., 845 F. Supp. 1367 (D.Alaska 1993).
INVOLUNTARY CONVERSIONS. The taxpayer sold
a farm to a city under threat of condemnation and purchased
another farm on which the taxpayer intended to build a
greenhouse, farm storage buildings, a farm pond, and fences
and to plant trees. Both the new and old properties would be
used in the production of agricultural products for profit.
The IRS ruled that the new property with the additional
improvements was replacement property eligible for the
nonrecognition of gain from the sale of the old property.
Ltr. Rul. 9421002, Feb. 2, 1994.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY. The taxpayers
converted a limited partnership into a limited liability
company (LLC). The IRS ruled that the LLC would be
taxed as a partnership because (1) the LLC lacked the
corporate characteristic of continuity of life since the state
LLC law and the LLC agreement required the consent of all
members to continue the partnership after a terminating
event, and (2) the LLC lacked the corporate characteristic of
transferability of interests because the Act and agreement
provided that if any other member objected to the sale or
assignment of a member’s interest in the LLC, the transferee
or assignee had no right to participate in the management of
the LLC. The IRS also ruled that (1) no gain was recognized
from the conversion of the limited partnership to the LLC,
(2) the basis and holding period of an interest in the LLC
were the same as the basis of the former partnership interest,
and (3) the basis of LLC property was the same as for the
partnership property. Ltr. Rul. 9421025, Feb. 24, 1994
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in May 1994,
the weighted average is 7.27 percent with the permissible
range of 6.55 to 8.00 percent for purposes of determining
the full funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice
94-56, I.R.B. 1994-22.
The IRS has revised the procedures by which a plan
sponsor  or authorized representative may file notice with an
obtain approval from the Secretary for a retroactive plan
amendment under I.R.C. § 412(c)(8). Rev. Proc. 94-42,
I.R.B. 1994-26.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
July 1994
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 5.63 5.55 5.51 5.49
110% AFR 6.20 6.11 6.06 6.03
120% AFR 6.77 6.66 6.61 6.57
Mid-term
AFR 6.83 6.72 6.66 6.63
110% AFR 7.53 7.39 7.32 7.28
120% AFR 8.22 8.06 7.98 7.93
Long-term
AFR 7.46 7.33 7.26 7.22
110% AFR 8.22 8.06 7.98 7.93
120% AFR 8.99 8.80 8.71 8.64
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
ELIGIBLE SHAREHOLDER. A general partnership
converted to a corporation by first forming the corporation,
issuing stock, transferring the stock to the partnership and
then terminating the partnership and issuing the stock to the
former partners. The IRS ruled that the partnership’s
momentary ownership of the stock did not prevent the
corporation from electing to be an S corporation. Ltr. Rul.
9421022, Feb. 24, 1994.
SALE OF RESIDENCE. Under a divorce decree, the
taxpayer’s former spouse received the right to use their
residence until the residence was sold. The court held that
the taxpayer could not rollover the taxpayer’s share of the
gain from the sale of the house because the house was not
used as the taxpayer’s principal residence at the time of the
sale. Perry v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-247.
SOCIAL SECURITY TAX-ALM § 4.06.*  The
plaintiffs were migrant seasonal agricultural workers who
worked on the defendants’ farm picking cucumbers. The
defendants were found to have issued combined payroll
checks for the plaintiffs under one name, sometimes under
one name and sometimes under the other. Social security
taxes were deducted and paid but only in the name of the
person receiving the wage check; however, social security
taxes were not deducted for wages for picking cucumbers.
The defendants argued that the plaintiffs were share farmers
as to the cucumbers and not subject to FICA withholding.
The court held that the issuing of combined wage checks
violated the FICA and that the mere picking of cucumbers
was not share farming under the FICA and was subject to
FICA withholding. Sanchez v. Overmyer, 845 F. Supp.





TAX LIENS . The taxpayers, husband and wife, owned
a residence as tenants by the entireties. The IRS filed a
notice of tax lien for taxes owed only by the husband. The
residence was sold at foreclosure to the mortgage holder
without notice to the IRS and the IRS sought levy against
the house, now owned by unrelated third parties. The court
held that under Wyoming law, the husband had no separate
interest in the residence to which the tax lien could attach;
therefore, the federal tax lien for the separate taxes owed by
the husband did not attach to the residence. Talbot v. U.S.,
94-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,273 (D. Wyo. 1994).
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
CORNPICKER. The plaintiff’s hand was injured while
attempting to clean a running cornpicker manufactured by
the defendant. The plaintiff alleged that the cornpicker was
negligently designed because the cornpicker did not have
an emergency shut-off switch near the rollers where the
hand was caught for over 30 minutes. The defendant argued
that the cornpicker was not negligently designed because
the design comported with farm implement industry custom
and practice in the design of cornpickers. The court held
that industry custom and practice were not evidence of the
state of the art design which would be a defense to
negligent design and the plaintiff had shown that
emergency switches were generally available for roller type
machines. Hillrichs v. Avco Corp., 514 N.W.2d 94 (Iowa
1994).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
FEDERAL FARM PRODUCTS RULE-ALM §
13.01[4][a].* The debtor granted a priority security interest
in crops to the plaintiff. The debtor also granted a junior
security interest in the crops to a commission merchant.
The debtor delivered the crop to the commission merchant
who sold the crop and retained the proceeds to pay off the
secured loan. The plaintiff sued for recovery of the
proceeds, arguing that its security interest had priority. The
commission merchant argued that under the federal farm
products rule, commission merchants can sell crops free of
any security interest. The court held that the federal farm
products rule did not apply to commission merchants who
were also lenders and who retained the proceeds of the sale
to pay a loan. Food Services of America v. Royal Heights,
871 P.2d 590 (Wash. 1994).
CITATION UPDATES
Irvine v. U.S., 114 S.Ct. 1473 (1994), rev’g, 981 F.2d
991 (8th Cir. 1992), rev’g on rehearing, 936 F.2d 343
(8th Cir. 1991), rev'g, 89-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
13,818 (D. Minn. 1989) (disclaimers) see p. 76 supra.
Kraft, Inc. v. U.S., 30 Fed. Cls. 739 (1994)
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